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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 Since the times of the Socratic philosophers, thinkers have considered categories 
as defined by a set of rules that determine what items are in, and what items are out, of a 
category.  This viewpoint was challenged by a series of studies performed by Eleanor 
Rosch and her colleagues who found that people did not view category members as 
starkly in or out of a category as would be expected if there were strict rules that 
governed category membership, but instead found graded membership where some items 
were more or less in a category than others (Rosch & Mervis, 1975).  Since inclusivity 
rules did not seem to govern category membership, Rosch et al. explored a category 
structuring proposed by Ludwig Wittgenstein that categories were defined by a loose 
affiliation of attributes – a family resemblance, where each member: a) had more of a 
selection of attributes that were shared by other members of their category, and b) had 
less of a selection of attributes that were shared by members outside of their category 
(Wittgenstein, 1953).  To paraphrase Wittgenstein’s famous example, the best example of 
a game would have the most attributes shared by other games: rules, teams, a ball, etc.  
Similarly, this best example game would lack the features common to other categories: 
the limbs of an animal, the flat surface of furniture, the careful consideration of 
international diplomacy, etc. 
 Rosch and Mervis tested this theory in a series of experiments by having some 
subjects list attributes of basic level categories (e.g., different types of chairs) as well as 
having others list attributes of subcategory members of superordinate categories (e.g., 
different types of furniture) (Rosch & Mervis, 1975). Investigating the first part of the 
family resemblance claim, they found that for both category members and basic level 
categories, the category members that had many overlapping attributes with their fellow 
category members were rated as more prototypical of their category – that is, better 
examples of their category – by subjects in an earlier experiment.  As for the second part 
 2 
of the family resemblance claim, Rosch et al. had subjects list attributes of car and chair 
exemplars and looked to see how frequently those attributes overlapped with other 
members of the vehicle and furniture superordinate category respectively.  They found a 
significantly negative correlation, such that the fewer attributes an item had overlapping 
with other category members, the more prototypical it was rated of its category. 
 It seems that with existent categories, then, people are sensitive to multiple 
attributes of a category and the distribution of those attributes in the makeup of category 
structure.  Importantly, this type of category structuring was not predicted by thousands 
of years of introspecting on the nature of categorization, indicating that our categorization 
behavior does not spring from a clear cut and methodical examination of our 
surroundings (as occurs in scientific taxonomy) but instead arises from a non-conscious 
predilection for ordering the world according to certain implicit rules. 
 It was for this reason that it was so surprising when a study by Medin, 
Wattenmaker, and Hampson indicated that people don’t create family resemblance 
categories when sorting exemplars in the lab (Medin, Wattenmaker, & Hampson, 1987).   
In their first of a series of experiments, they gave subjects instances of cartoon bugs that 
had been created in one of two categories, each with a prototype and four perturbations 
that deviated from the prototype in only one of its four dimensions.  They found that 
subjects were unwilling to sort these exemplars using a family resemblance strategy that 
placed each prototype with its perturbations; instead, every subject picked a single feature 
dimension and sorted based on that dimension. 
 In later experiments, Medin et al. tried a number of methods to induce their 
participants to use a family resemblance method to categorize.  Rosch and Mervis’ 
original studies indicate that family resemblance sorting is the sort which maximizes the 
within category resemblance while minimizing the between category resemblance (Rosch 
& Mervis, 1975). In accordance with this, Medin et al. tried adding more dimensions to 
the stimuli in order to increase the extent to which family resemblance sorting would 
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maximize within category resemblance while minimizing between category 
resemblances.  In another attempt to get subjects to create family resemblance sorting, 
they made each dimension have three potential values so that subjects should be unable to 
pick one dimension and divide the exemplars into two categories.  Medin et al. also tried: 
using verbal descriptions of the exemplars instead of pictures, having each trait 
instantiated in different ways for each verbal description (e.g., if the dimension is 
carefulness, one person was described as conscientious, another as exacting), highlighting 
the prototype of each category, and having subjects consider the genetic evolution of each 
category.  None of these manipulations created a notable amount of family resemblance 
sorting. 
Potential Explanations –Existent Knowledge 
 Why do subjects in laboratory settings categorize based on a single dimension?  
One possible answer is that subjects have no reason to attend to multiple dimensions. In 
their study of family resemblance categorization, Medin et al. conclude that background 
knowledge of the dimensions of a category is sufficient to induce subjects to focus on 
more than one dimension and create family resemblance categories (Medin et al., 1987).  
In one set of experiments where the stimuli were descriptions of people, they found that 
when all of the dimensions related to extroversion/introversion, with dimensions such as 
outgoing vs. sad and entertaining vs. inhibited, about 25% of the subjects picked up on 
the structuring and constructed their categories based on an overall sense of how 
introverted or extroverted each exemplar was.  Furthermore, when they told subjects that 
some of the people were extroverted while others are introverted, a majority of subjects 
categorized based on a family resemblance strategy rather than categorizing 
unidimensionally.  Medin et al. also added background knowledge to the dimensions of 
their insect drawings by making one category have features useful for flying (e.g., having 
a small body and beak) and the other having features not useful for flying.  Subjects were 
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willing/able to attend to multiple dimensions once their background knowledge tied these 
dimensions together. 
 The importance of using background knowledge in creating family resemblance 
categories was supported in a study by Spalding and Murphy in which subjects are shown 
category exemplars in which the features are either integrated to relate to a theme or were 
unrelated to a theme (Spalding & Murphy, 1996).  For example, one pair of categories in 
the integrated condition were composed of features relating to either an arctic vehicle 
(made in Norway, heavily insulated, white, etc.) or an equatorial vehicle (made in Africa, 
lightly insulated, green, etc.) while the unrelated condition just had two categories each 
with car features (color, transmission type, interior) differing between the two categories.  
In both conditions, their exemplars also had a feature randomly assigned to each (e.g., 
location of license plate) that was always present and cut across category to allow 
subjects to categorize based on a single dimension.  Spalding and Murphy found that 
subjects who were asked to sort the exemplars with the integrated features were more 
likely to create family resemblance categories and less likely to create unidimensional 
sorts as compared to the subjects in the unrelated condition.  Again, background 
knowledge was a sufficient component to get subjects to attend to multiple dimensions. 
 It seems, then, that subjects use themes to make sense of why multiple dimensions 
are important.  When subjects believe an item’s dimensions are related to a theme, they 
are able to integrate those dimensions and use them to evaluate whether sets of features 
fit into that theme.  In a family resemblance structured category, each exemplar is not 
going to have the same set of features.  If subjects can recognize the overall theme that 
distinguishes the two categories, they will see if the features present fit into the overall 
theme.  Spalding and Murphy found that this was not an automatic process, for when 
subjects just sorted the exemplars without reading them over first, they sorted the 
integrated feature categories by family resemblance significantly less than subjects who 
were asked to read the cards before sorting.  This indicates that without thinking about 
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how the features in each exemplar are related to each other, the subjects won’t have an 
incentive to access their background knowledge when categorizing and therefore will 
have less incentive to attend to multiple dimensions. 
 This does not mean, however, that categorization requires a lot of accessing of 
background knowledge.  A study by Kaplan and Murphy showed subjects exemplars 
from two categories, each of which had six features of which only one was indicative of a 
larger theme that tied the exemplars together into a category (Kaplan & Murphy, 1999).  
They found that when this division of this thematic dimension was aligned with the 
general family resemblance structure of the two categories, subjects picked up on the 
structuring to a significantly greater degree.  Kaplan and Murphy also showed that 
subjects were not just creating an abstract but singular dimension out of the theme and 
sorting on that dimension, because when the division of the thematic dimension ran 
orthogonal to the rest of the category structures, very few subjects sorted along that 
theme. 
Potential Solutions – Created Knowledge 
 In addition to relying upon existent knowledge, it appears that family resemblance 
categories can be built upon knowledge created inside the lab.  One way to generate 
knowledge in the lab is to manipulate how subjects interact with the exemplars they are 
going to categorize.  In their review paper on the impact of category use on category 
structuring, Markman and Ross theorize that differences in category structuring are due 
to the tasks that subjects are asked to perform when they learn the categories (Markman 
& Ross, 2003).  Specifically, classification tasks focus subjects’ attention on what 
differentiates between categories while inference tasks focus subject’s attention on the 
internal structure of the category, making subjects in inference tasks more likely to reflect 
these relationships between dimensions in the categories they create.  It is these 
relationships that prompt subjects to create the complex family dimension categories. 
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 As part of their evidence, Markman and Ross cite a study by Lasaline and 
Murphy that shows subjects create differently structured categories depending on their 
initial interactions with the information that they are categorizing (Lassaline & Murphy, 
1996).  In two experiments, subjects looked at a set of exemplars (animals, novel bugs, 
etc.), with some subjects either making judgments about the frequencies of their 
properties (e.g., how many have a short tail?) while others made inductive judgments 
about the relationship between the properties (e.g., if this animal has a short tail, what 
kind of teeth does it have?).  For both existent and fictitious objects, Lassaline and 
Murphy found that the subjects who make induction judgments were three times more 
likely to create family resemblance categories than subjects in both the frequency 
judgments and the mere observation conditions.   They take this as evidence that subjects 
in the typical category construction task will not go through the effort to attend to 
multiple dimensions unless they are given incentive to, such as needing to distribute 
attention across dimensions in order to complete the induction task. 
Potential Solutions – No Knowledge 
 It appears that one solution to the problem of single dimension categorization is 
tapping into subjects’ background knowledge, whether the subjects brought that 
knowledge into the experiment with them or if it was generated in the experiment before 
the categorization occurs.  Outside of the province of categorization, there have been 
some studies that indicate subjects might be making multidimensional category 
judgments without tapping into background knowledge.  For instance, in a study that 
investigated the dissociation between recognition memory and categorization, Knowlton 
and Squire showed amnesic and normal controls a series of dot patterns that were all 
permutations of a prototype (Knowlton & Squire, 1993).  These images were a series of 
dots that varied across the x and y dimensions in the vein of Posner and Keele’s classic 
dot pattern experiments (Posner & Keele, 1968).  Some of these patterns had dots that 
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were randomly distributed across the screen while others had dots positioned as a 
permutation of a prototype shape.  After a brief waiting period, subjects were shown new 
patterns and asked both if the images came from the same set as the original training 
patterns as well as if they had seen that particular pattern before.  Although the amnesiacs 
performed worse than normals at recognizing old patterns, they performed comparably at 
saying whether the patterns belonged to the category presented during training.  A follow 
up study by Palmeri and Flanery showed the same stimuli to normal subjects who 
believed that they had subliminally seen the training patterns but in reality had not seen 
them, therefore approximating amnesiacs (Palmeri & Flanery, 1999).  These subjects 
were also able to correctly categorize the dot patterns after a few trials to a similar level 
as the subjects in the Knolton and Squire experiment, but were unable to “recognize” the 
“trained” patterns  (as expected, since they had never seen them). 
 Taken together, these studies hint that people can be sensitive to a 
multidimensional pattern when shown a series of category members.  Subjects in these 
experiments had no background knowledge of the dot patterns and did not rely on them 
to perform a task, yet they still identified members of a category that was distributed 
across two visual dimensions.  These studies indicate that subjects can be induced to 
categorize in a complex fashion without appealing to their background knowledge, either 
directly or through using the features to perform a task.  However, both experiments used 
the same stimuli, in which the “in-category” dot pattern was an upside down “U” shape.  
It seems possible that subjects could learn the category by noticing that this shape keeps 
reappearing, rather than attending to the location of each set of dots in their two spatial 
dimensions.  While this may not be problematic for the original experiments, it may be 
for the present one because it deals explicitly with whether people will spontaneously 
create categories that are dependent on multiple dimensions.  
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Potential Solutions – Minimal Feedback 
 While most people don’t create categories for a living, everyone must learn a 
large quantity of categories (a type of personal category creation).  When learning new 
categories, people never receive the type of feedback seen in most categorization 
experiments.  That is, they do not get continual corrective feedback.  First, most 
categorization decisions are non-verbalized and so feedback is unlikely in these 
conditions (even the most precocious child won’t say “doggy” every time they see a dog).  
Second, people rarely give feedback on an explicit but correct categorization except for 
the feedback of smooth communication, and sometimes will fail to give feedback on an 
explicit and incorrect categorization, either due to politeness or indifference.  Perhaps a 
more natural feedback structure during a categorization experiment would promote 
complex category creation. 
Potential Solutions – Minimal Knowledge 
 Outside of the lab, a person rarely creates a new category without some 
knowledge of the field that the category exists in or a theory about what they are going to 
find.  For instance, a botanist may identify a new type of flower based on their already 
existent knowledge of the important components of plants combined with their 
knowledge of what has already been classified by science.  While their general 
knowledge of the field of botany is maximal, their knowledge related to the category they 
are creating prior to their creation of it is minimal.  It is only in the grouping of these 
items and their comparison to old groups that real knowledge is created.  This type of 
knowledge can be contrasted with the type of knowledge used in the category creation 
experiments of Spalding and Murphy where subjects already knew much about the 
categories and would have been able to predict features (Spalding & Murphy, 1996).  It is 
possible, then, that prior knowledge of the dimensions that makeup a category or the 
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existence of other, similar categories would be sufficient to spur complex category 
creation. 
 In light of these findings and hypotheses, I conducted three experiments to test 
whether subjects can create categories using multiple dimensions without using their 
knowledge of the objects they are categorizing or the categories these objects are being 
sorted into.  The first experiment is a variation on the Knowlton and Squire, and Palmeri 
and Flanery experiments designed to test how well their findings generalize to stimuli 
with unassociated dimensions. The second experiment tests whether subjects will create 
multidimensional categories if they are given infrequent feedback on the quality of their 
categorization performance.  The third experiment tests whether people can create a new 
multidimensional category consisting of previously unseen stimuli mixed in with stimuli 
whose categories are already known. 
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CHAPTER 2 
GENERAL METHODS 
Participants 
 Participants in each of these experiments were undergraduate students at the 
University of Massachusetts, Amherst.  They were all enrolled in various psychology 
courses that allowed participation in experiments in return for extra credit, and they each 
received two credits in return for their participation.  No subject participated in more than 
one of these experiments. 
Apparatus and Procedure 
 Subjects performed the experiment individually in isolated rooms.  After being 
greeted by the researcher and signing a consent form, they were seated in a room 
containing an Apple eMac.  The experiments were presented within the MATLAB 
framework using Psychtoolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997).  Each experiment took 
about 45 minutes to complete.  After completing the experiment, subjects were debriefed 
first with a description of the experiment on the computer, then verbally by the 
researcher, and finally, thanked for their participation. 
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CHAPTER 3 
EXPERIMENT 1 
 This experiment was based largely on the experiments of Knowlton and Squire, 
and Palmeri and Flanery, who found that subjects were able to identify members of a 
multidimensional category while viewing them embedded in a stream of stimuli 
(Knowlton & Squire, 1993; Palmeri & Flanery, 1999).  Experiment 1 presented subjects 
with a stream of multidimensional stimuli, some of which were generated randomly and 
some of which came from a prototype.  I hypothesized that subjects would eventually be 
able to see a pattern hidden in a string of random elements, and therefore would pick out 
these instances as being “in the category.”  Importantly, in order to perform this task, 
subjects would have to attend to both dimensions of the stimuli.  Additionally, I 
hypothesized that size and standard deviation of a category would impact the ease with 
which a person can notice a multidimensional category among noise.  Specifically, I 
expect that the smaller the standard deviation of a category, and the greater the 
membership of a category, the more salient it would be, and subjects will be most likely 
to create multidimensional categories in the low standard deviation – high category 
membership condition. 
 There were three main differences between the original experiments and the 
current one: a) The stimuli – in this experiment, the stimuli were circles with radial lines 
that can vary by size of the circle and angle of the line as opposed to the original 
experiments which used dot patterns that could vary along two dimensions, b) the 
category – in this experiment, the category prototype was randomly selected for each 
subject as opposed to the original experiment in which a predetermined horseshoe shaped 
category was used for each subject, and c) the cover story – subjects were explicitly 
informed that they do not know the categories they were sorting stimuli into, while in the 
original experiments subjects were either amnesiacs or were temporary amnesiacs (i.e., 
tricked into thinking they had seen the stimuli before when they had not). 
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Method 
Stimuli and Design 
 Participants were shown 1000 images of circles with radial lines that were a 
randomized mixture of category and non-category members.  The circle could vary 
continuously along its size dimension and the radial line could vary continuously along 
its angle dimension (Figure 1).  For each subject, a stimulus was chosen randomly to be 
the category prototype from the potential stimulus space.  Category members were 
generated by adding Gaussian noise to each of the stimulus dimensions of the prototype.  
Non-category members were generated by sampling from a uniform distribution of the 
stimulus space and adding Gaussian noise to each dimension.  A clear example of this 
type of category can be seen picked out by the ellipse in the lower right hand corner of 
Figure 2 panel 5, in which each point represents one of the last 900 stimuli that the 
subject was shown.  A green circle means the subject placed the stimulus into “the 
category,” while a black plus sign means that placed it out of “the category.”  The large 
cluster in the corner shows that many of the stimuli the subject saw were very close in 
their feature dimensions. 
 In order to investigate the importance of category properties on people’s 
sensitivity to multiple dimensions, the standard deviation of the Gaussian distribution 
applied to the category prototype was varied as a between subjects factor with three 
levels: low, medium, and high deviation.  Additionally, the number of category members 
also varied as a between subjects factor, with some subjects seeing 25%, 50%, or 75% of 
their stimuli generated from the category prototype.  It is hypothesized that the more 
similar the category members are to each other (i.e., the lower the standard deviation) and 
the more category members that there are, the more likely the subjects will be to make a 
complex category.  These two factors made for a three-by-three between subjects 
factorial design.  For each subject, the remaining percentage of stimuli, the non-category 
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members, were selected randomly from the potential stimulus space, regardless of the 
location of the category prototype. 
Participants 
 There were 55 subjects in this experiment, and the experiment program randomly 
assigned each to one of the conditions.  For the low-density condition, five subjects saw 
the low category membership condition, four saw the medium category membership 
condition, and six saw high category membership condition.  For the medium-density 
condition, eight saw the low category membership condition, eight saw the medium 
category membership condition, and six saw the high category membership condition.  
For the high-density condition, seven saw the low category membership condition, six 
saw the medium category membership condition, and five saw the high category 
membership condition. 
Procedures 
 Subjects were instructed that they would see a series of circles with lines in them, 
and that their job was to determine which images are “in the group” and which “are not.”  
Additionally, they were reassured that “It may take some time to understand the nature of 
the group, but a pattern should become evident with time.  Don't get discouraged!”  After 
reading these instructions, subjects viewed the stimuli serially, and while viewing each, 
were asked to indicate whether the drawing “is from the group” or “not from the group,” 
by pressing one of two keys on a standard computer keyboard.  Subjects received no 
feedback throughout the experiment. 
Results 
Descriptives 
 The primary question of analysis is what criteria did subjects use when creating 
their categories?  To this end, it is important to know whether they performed the task of 
categorizing at all and how well they did on an objective measure.  On average, subjects 
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put 358 exemplars into “the category,” with a standard deviation of 201 (see Table 1 for 
results broken down by condition).  One subject put no exemplars into the category while 
another put only one. 
 Although to the subject’s perspective there was no correct or incorrect response, it 
is possible to compare their categorization decisions to how the stimuli were generated 
(that is, from the category prototype or randomly for the non-category members).  On 
average, subjects categorized 59% of the stimuli in accordance with how they were 
generated (Table 1).  Since the non-category members could have any possible set of 
features, including the same features as the category prototype, even knowing the 
information used to generate the category would not assure 100% correct performance.  
On average, if subjects had known the generating information, they would have been able 
to correctly categorize 87% of the stimuli, with the low standard deviation – high 
category membership condition being the easiest and the high standard deviation – low 
category membership being the most difficult (Table 1). 
Modeling 
 In Experiment 1, subjects were presented with a stream of stimuli, some 
perturbations of a prototype and others randomly generated.  I hypothesized that subjects 
would see a pattern across the dimensions of the stimuli in the string of random elements, 
and therefore would pick out these instances as being “in the category.”  Furthermore, I 
hypothesized that this categorization behavior would be moderated by an increase in 
category standard deviation, and a decrease in category membership.  In order to infer 
subjects’ sorting strategy, each subject’s data were represented in three dimensional 
space, with the first dimension being size of the circle, the second being angle of the line, 
and the third a binary dimension of whether the subject said the stimulus was “in the 
category.”  Once in this format, a series of models were fit to individual subject’s data, 
each one representing a different categorization strategy, with the best fitting model being 
the one that best divides the stimuli subjects said were “in the category” from ones 
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subjects said were “out of the category”.  Five different models were fit: two lines, two 
bands, and an ellipse.  The lines represent setting a single criterion along one of the 
dimensions, with one model being a vertical line, representing a one-dimensional sorting 
strategy based on circle size, and the other being a horizontal line, representing a one-
dimensional sorting strategy based on line angle. The bands represent selecting out a 
narrow range of features along one dimension, with non-category members have values 
both greater and less than the category members.  One band model was a vertical band, 
representing a one-dimensional strategy where subjects categorize based on a limited 
range of circle sizes, and the other was a horizontal band, representing a one-dimensional 
strategy where subjects categorize based on a limited range of line angles.  The final 
model fit was an ellipse, representing a two-dimensional strategy where subjects 
categorize based on a combination of ranges of circle sizes and line angles.  Figure 2 
shows examples of subject’s data with the best fitting model plotted on top. 
 Additionally, a random model was calculated to see if subjects just randomly 
assigned the exemplars to a category, based on the frequency of the subjects’ indication 
of an exemplar being in the category, specifically, percent designated in category, 
squared plus percent designated out of category, squared.   For example, in guessing the 
subject’s performance, if a subject put 90% of the stimuli into the category, you would 
get 90% of the in the category members correct by guessing “in the category” 90% of the 
time and you would get 10% of the “out of the category” stimuli correct by guessing “out 
of the category” 10% of the time.  Therefore, without assuming a structure to the 
responses, you could correctly guess the subject’s response 82% of the time.  A two-
dimensional linear model (that is, two perpendicular lines), however, was not fit because: 
a) The categories were designed based on the intersection of two Gaussian distributions, 
so the optimal response would be circular, and b) a two dimensional linear model could 
not detect a two dimensional category that was not at the corner of the stimulus space, 
while an elliptical model could select out a complex category in any part of the space. 
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 Model fitting was performed using percent correct as the fit value to be 
maximized, which was calculated by summing the number of in-category members on 
one side of the boundary along with the out-of-category members on the other side and 
dividing by the total number of exemplars.  Since subjects were by necessity guessing at 
the beginning of the experiment, the first 100 trials were considered training and the 
models were fit to the last 900 trials.  Each model was fit to the data and adjusted so as to 
maximize the percent correct. 
 In order to cross validate the models and make sure the ellipse model was not 
given an undue advantage for having more parameters, model performance was 
calculated by holding out 10 stimuli without replacement, and fitting the models to the 
remaining data (which include previously held out stimuli).  These models were used to 
predict the category membership of the held out stimuli.  This process was repeated until 
all of the stimuli have been held out, and predictions made of their category membership.  
Once each model had predicted the membership of every stimulus, the models were 
compared based on percent correct predictions of the held out stimuli.  If the elliptical 
model is superior solely because of its increased parameters, it will over-fit the data given 
to the model, and will do a poorer job of predicting the held out data.  Because the 
primary question is if subjects use both dimensions in constructing their categories, the 
first concern is if any of the models fit better than the random model, and the next 
concern is if the elliptical model performed better than the other linear model. 
 Since the analysis depends on dividing the “in the category” from the “out of the 
category,” the models were fit to the data of the 53 subjects who put more than 10 
exemplars into the category. Since the primary question of interest is how many 
dimensions did the subject attend to, results are collapsed across band and linear models 
of the same dimensions.  For comparison, 95% confidence intervals are included where 
sample size allows.  Overall, the majority of subjects (68% ± 12) were best fit by models 
along the angle dimension (Table 2).  More importantly, only 13% ± 9 of the subjects 
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were best fit by the ellipse model, indicating that most subjects were not attending to both 
dimensions.  The two conditions with the highest percentage of subjects who were best fit 
by the ellipse model were the high category membership conditions with either the low or 
medium standard deviations, indicating that when underlying category structure was 
more visible and cohesive, subjects were more likely to attend to multiple dimensions in 
constructing their categories.  Likewise, the low category membership conditions were 
the only conditions where subjects’ responses were best fit by the random model, 
indicating that when underlying category structure is not easily visible, subjects may have 
a difficult time constructing any coherent category. 
Discussion 
 Experiment 1 was designed to test whether the multidimensional categorization 
behavior seen as a byproduct in the experiments of Knowlton and Squire, and Palmeri 
and Flanery would be present in an experiment designed to test multidimensional 
categorization (Knowlton & Squire, 1993; Palmeri & Flanery, 1999).  I hypothesized that 
when subjects were shown a stream of stimuli, some created from a multidimensional 
prototype and others created randomly, they would be able to distinguish the ones created 
from the prototype and thereby develop a multidimensional category.  Additionally, I 
hypothesized both that the more exemplars derived from the prototype that there were, 
and the smaller the standard of deviation that there was, the greater the proportion of 
subjects that would create a multidimensional category. 
 This experiment found no evidence for the first hypothesis.  Overall, only 13% ± 
9 of the subjects created multidimensional categories, a percentage seemingly not 
reflective of the vast amounts of multidimensional categories that people use on a daily 
basis.  Tellingly, this number is only slightly higher than the results Medin and colleagues 
found in their original category creation experiments before they introduced background 
knowledge (Medin et al., 1987).  Results for the second hypothesis are a little more 
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mixed.  In instances where there were a high number of category members, almost four 
times as many subjects created multidimensional categories than the medium or low 
conditions.  Still, this means that less than a third of the subjects in this condition created 
multidimensional categories, and this in the heavy-handed situation where three out of 
every four stimuli the subjects see should resemble each other.  Similarly, only subjects 
in the condition with the low number of category members were best fit by the random 
model, indicating that they were having the hardest time categorizing according to any 
dimension.  While there still may be order to their responses that was not picked up by 
the models (such as putting every fourth stimulus into the category), they did not divide 
up the stimulus space according to either of the two stimulus dimensions.  It seems that 
no matter which dimension (or dimensions) they were attending to, they did not notice 
any area of features appearing more frequently than any other. 
 This experiment has two implications.  First, it adds to the evidence that 
multidimensional categorization is not the default behavior of subjects who are creating 
categories in a laboratory setting.  Second, it indicates that the behavior described by 
Knowlton and Squire, and Palmeri and Flanery as categorization behavior may not be 
multidimensional categorization or it may actually be some other type of behavior 
altogether.  As discussed earlier, the dot-pattern stimuli used by Knowlton and Squire, 
and Plameri and Flanery that were category members all had an upside-down “U” shape, 
which was perhaps a familiar enough shape that the dimensions were perceived as a 
unified whole rather than a collection of points in two dimensions.  It is also possible that 
people have the ability to discern order from chaos, without being able to identify what 
that order is, and this was the behavior that had been considered to be intact 
categorization in amnesiacs. 
 An unforeseen confound to Experiment 1 was that, during debriefing, some 
subjects reported constructing their category based on the smoothness of the radial line.  
When the line was at either 90°, 180°, 270°, or 360°, it was straight and smooth.  At other 
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angles, it became squiggly – a problem in computer graphics called aliasing.  The 
smoothness of the line, therefore, became an unanticipated third dimension for some 
subjects that was not included in the modeling of their categorization behavior.  This 
problem led to the use of new stimuli in Experiments 2 and 3, and in the future, the 
current experiment should be replicated with stimuli that are purely two-dimensional. 
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CHAPTER 4 
EXPERIMENT 2 
 This experiment attempted to more naturalistically reflect the feedback people 
receive when they learn new categories.  The original category creation experiments grew 
out of a feeling of the artificiality of categorization experiments in which subjects were 
asked to learn a category while receiving feedback after every category judgment.  This is 
very different from category learning experiences in the real world, where someone is 
neither going to confirm you every time you make a correct category judgment or correct 
you every time you make an incorrect judgment, especially considering that most 
category judgments remain unvoiced.  The traditional unsupervised category creation 
experiment may have gone too far in the opposite direction, however, and has presented 
category learning as occurring in a social vacuum – however the subject wants to 
organize the stimuli is okay with the experimenter.  Surely a person will receive some 
feedback from those around them when trying to learn a category that is new to them, or 
even if constructing a category new to the society.  In this vein, Experiment 2 replicates 
Experiment 1 but provides subjects with minimal feedback.  Specifically, subjects are 
never told if any categorization judgment is correct or incorrect, but are instead 
intermittently given their percent correct score. 
Method 
Stimuli and design 
 Like Experiment 1, a category exemplar is selected for each subject, and 
permutations of that exemplar are made for the category members, while non-category 
members are created by randomly sampling the potential stimulus space.  Fifty percent of 
the stimuli were created by permuting the prototype, and fifty percent were created by 
random sampling. 
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 During Experiment 1, some subjects reported basing their category decisions on 
whether the radial line was smooth (i.e., aliased), an unanticipated emergent third 
dimension. Therefore, two new stimulus types were created – an alien cell that varied 
continuously by the color of its nucleus and the length of its mitochondria (see Figure 3 
for examples of the cells) and line drawings of human faces, which varied continuously 
by the distance between their eyes, and the distance between their nose and mouth. (see 
Figure 4 for examples of the faces).  The alien cells were created to have two dimensions 
that were perceptually distinct, while the faces were created to have two dimensions that 
were perceptually unified.  A difference in performance between the two stimuli might 
shed light on the stimuli used in by Palmeri and Flanery, and Knowlton and Squire, for it 
would show that when subjects are able to unify dimensions, they may display 
categorization behavior that appears to be complex but is actually simple, such as in 
responding to the inverted “U” in the Palmeri and Flanery, and Knowlton and Squire 
experiments. 
 There has been much research into the perception of faces indicating that they are 
treated differently than most other stimuli (Maurer, Grand, & Mondloch, 2002).  For 
example, humans have an area of the fusiform gyrus that responds preferentially to face-
like objects (McCarthy, Puce, Gore, & Allison, 1997), and newborns will prefer to orient 
themselves towards face-like objects (Johnson, Dziurawiec, Ellis, & Morton, 1991).  
Nevertheless, even though people are sensitive to what’s called the first-order relations of 
a face (eyes over nose over mouth), they are also aware of the second-order relations of a 
face – the distance between the eyes and the distance between the nose and the mouth.  
For instance, Haig showed that subjects are able to differentiate between an “original 
face” and one that had been modified to have its second-order relations changed (Haig, 
1984).  Additionally, categorization research done by Nosofky using line drawings of 
faces that were categorized along the same second-order dimensions showed that people 
are able to learn categories that vary along these dimensions (Nosofsky, 1991).  These 
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findings indicate that faces are suitable for the task of comprising categories that differ 
along two dimensions. 
Participants 
 There were 29 participants in the alien cell version of the experiment, and 30 in 
the face version. 
Procedures 
 The procedure of Experiment 2 was exactly the same as Experiment 1, except 
subjects were told that they would receive feedback “every once in a while.”  They were 
told that they would see a series of images, some of which form a group and some of 
which do not, and that it was their job to determine which is which.  Although not 
explicitly told this, subjects were presented with a screen displaying their percent correct 
score after every 100 trials for those 100 trials.  
Results 
Descriptives 
 In the alien cell version of the experiment, subjects put an average of 581 stimuli 
into “the category,” with a standard deviation of 101. On average, subjects categorized 
70% of the stimuli in accordance with how they were generated and if subjects had 
known the generating information, they would have been able to correctly categorize 
89% of the stimuli.  In the faces version of the experiment, subjects put an average of 557 
stimuli into “the category,” with a standard deviation of 120.  On average, subjects 
categorized 66% of the stimuli in accordance with how they were generated and if 
subjects had known the generating information, they would have been able to correctly 
categorize 90% of the stimuli.  In both versions, every subject put stimuli into “the 
category.” 
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Modeling 
 Modeling for Experiment 2 was performed exactly the same as for Experiment 1.  
All subjects were included in the models, and models were fit to all of their data 
excluding the first block of 100 trials.  I hypothesized that subjects would create 
multidimensional categories when given minimal feedback, and this would be displayed 
by their data being best fit by the two-dimensional ellipse model.  
 For the “alien cells” version, six subjects were best fit by a line across the color 
dimension, five were best fit by a line across the length dimension, three were best fit by 
a band across the color dimension, two were best fit by a band across the length 
dimension, thirteen were best fit by the ellipse model, and none were best fit by the 
random model (see Figure 5 for results collapsed across model to show which dimension 
or dimensions subjects primarily attended to).  For the faces version, four subjects were 
best fit by a line across the eye distance dimension, three were best fit by a line across the 
nose/mouth distance dimension, seven were best fit by a band across the eye distance 
dimension, one was best fit by a band across the nose/mouth distance dimension, fifteen 
were best fit by the ellipse model, and none were best fit by the random model (Figure 5). 
Discussion 
 Experiment 2 was conducted to test the hypothesis that, when subjects are given 
minimal feedback on their performance, they will be more willing/able to create 
multidimensional categories.  In the alien cell version of the experiment, 45% ± 17 of the 
subjects created multidimensional categories and in faces version of the experiment, 50% 
± 17 of the subjects created multidimensional categories.  Compared with 13% ± 9 of the 
subjects who made multidimensional categories in Experiment 1 without getting 
feedback (or, more appropriately, the 6% ± 14 of subjects in the medium proportion 
condition), this constitutes a significant increase in percentage of subjects creating 
multidimensional categories.  Indeed, when Medin et al. showed subjects 
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multidimensional objects that they had background knowledge of (Experiment 7), only 
39% of the subjects used multidimensional sorting (Medin et al., 1987). 
 What is it about receiving feedback that allowed or inspired subjects to categorize 
complexly?  One possibility is that subjects were hypothesis testing, and that when all of 
their attempts at unidimensional categorization did not produce acceptable results, they 
expended the extra effort to attend to multiple dimensions.  Another possibility is that 
there was a social pressure to try harder in the presence of the external judgment of 
percent correct scores.  All the subjects were college students, some of whom are very 
sensitive about grades, and during debriefing, some seemed upset with themselves that 
they had not performed as well as they hoped, even after they were assured that there 
wasn’t truly a correct answer.  A third possibility is that this experiment mirrors the social 
give and take of communication enough to spur a more natural category structure. 
 While this study was conducted as a follow-up to Experiment 1’s no feedback 
condition, Experiment 1 cannot truly be seen as a baseline for this experiment because of 
the difference in stimuli, and though it is unlikely it is possible that these findings are due 
to the change in stimuli.  Future follow-ups to Experiment 2 should contain a no feedback 
condition.  Follow-ups should also test the various explanations for these findings.  To 
test if subjects were hypothesis testing, the same experiment can be performed using an 
eyetracker, where subjects’ attention to dimensions can be recorded on a trial-by-trial 
basis, and the allotment of their attention can be analyzed over time.  The social pressure 
hypothesis can be tested by modulating the importance of the percent correct score, such 
as by preceding the experiment with a fictitious previous high score that is either high or 
low.   The interpersonal effects of the feedback can be tested by increasing the 
interpersonal way that the way in which the feedback is given, such as having it reported 
by a recorded voice, rather than by words on a computer screen.  Furthermore, these 
findings raise the question of how much feedback is enough to incite multidimensional 
categorization, and future studies should test the effects different amounts of feedback, 
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exploring the gap between the current experiment, where subjects received feedback nine 
times, and the no feedback condition. 
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CHAPTER 5 
EXPERIMENT 3 
 This experiment was based on the act of taxonomists identifying new species in 
the field.  Taxonomists decide whether entities belong to a known category or come from 
a new, unknown category.  New categories are usually dimensionally rich, e.g., many 
aspects of the plant need to be considered.  Like the subjects in Spalding and Murphy’s 
experiment, where subjects were already familiar with the features of arctic and 
equatorial objects, the subjects in Experiment 3 were made familiar with the features that 
comprise the new categories that they create (Spalding & Murphy, 1996).  Unlike 
Spalding and Murphy’s subjects, however, for whom the features were causally related 
and thus tapped a deeper underlying knowledge structure, the feature correlations in this 
experiment only extend to the perceptual features of the category members with no 
underlying causal structure.  Additionally, while the subjects in Spalding and Murphy’s 
experiment constructed their category out of the items that were directly linked to their 
prior knowledge, prior knowledge in this experiment will only serve as a grounding for 
stimuli with a never before seen arrangement of features. 
 In this vein, Experiment 3 utilized the stimuli from Experiment 2.  Instead of 
randomly selecting the location for a category, however, each of the four corners of the 
space was used to make a category.  Subjects were then trained on three of these 
categories to simulate the prior knowledge a taxonomist might have.  During testing, 
subjects were presented with instances from all four categories and given an option to say 
that an exemplar “does not fit the three learned categories,” phrased so as to reduce 
demand characteristics to construct a cohesive category.  I hypothesized that, like 
taxonomists, subjects would use multiple dimensions to recognize previously unknown 
arrangement of features, and would identify these as not belonging to any known 
category – the first step to creating a new category (also the largest step, after deciding 
how to convert your name into Latin). 
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Method 
Stimuli and design 
 This experiment had three phases: two training phases and a testing phase.  In 
order to facilitate learning, the first training phase had subjects passively view ten 
instances of each of the three known categories so they could get a sense of the stimulus 
space (exactly which three categories were taught were rotated between subjects).  
During the second training phase, subjects were presented with randomly mixed members 
of the three known categories and had to respond with which category the exemplar 
belonged.  During this phase, if they categorized the exemplar correctly, they were told 
that the response was correct and were reminded what category they selected.  If they 
categorized the exemplar incorrectly, they were told that they were incorrect, and the 
correct category membership was shown.  This phase continued until subjects either 
categorized 40 of the last 50 trials correctly or had gone through 200 training trials.  Once 
training was over, subjects entered the testing phase, where they were asked to categorize 
exemplars of all four categories without feedback.  They were given the three original 
category options, as well as a fourth option of “this item does not fit any of the 
categories.”  During this phase, subjects saw 600 exemplars – 150 from each category 
randomly mixed.  The same stimuli from Experiment 2 are used in two different versions 
of Experiment 3, namely, the alien cells and the faces. 
Participants 
 Forty-three subjects participated in the “alien cell” version of the experiment and 
30 subjects participated in the faces version. 
Procedures 
 In the alien cell version of the experiment, subjects were told that they were 
biologists working for NASA, who had recently discovered three different types of single 
cell life on Mars.  During learning they were instructed to learn these three different 
types.  During the testing phase, subjects were told that they were looking at a cell sample 
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from another region of Mars, and were instructed to categorize the cells they saw, noting 
if they see cells that they “believe the cell is a new species.”  In the faces version of the 
experiment, subjects were told they are planning a family reunion for a family with three 
branches, and it is their job to seat the guests.  During learning phase, they were 
instructed to learn to identify members of each branch.  During the testing phase, they 
were told that they are organizing a family photo for people only related by blood, and 
that it was their job to: a) group people by branch, and b) note if they see faces of anyone 
that they “believe is from none of the clans.” 
Results 
Descriptives 
 In the alien cell version of the experiment, 21 out of 43 subjects learned the three 
categories to criterion.  During testing, subjects categorized an average of 50% of the 
learned category members in accordance with their generating prototypes.  Those 
subjects who learned the categories to criterion during training categorized 50% in 
accordance with their generating prototypes while those subjects who did not learn to 
criterion only categorized 52% in accordance with their generating prototypes.  If 
subjects were able to perfectly use the learned generating prototypes, they would have 
been able to get an average of 86% correct.  Overall, subjects categorized 16% of the 
unlearned exemplars according to their generating prototype, with subjects who learned 
the categories correctly categorizing 23% and subjects who did not learn the categories 
correctly categorizing 9%.  On average, subjects put 63 exemplars into the “other” 
category, with a standard deviation of 82.  As this hints, nine subjects did not put any 
exemplars into the “other” category during the testing phase, five of whom learned the 
categories to criterion during training.  Again, although subjects were told that they had 
the option to put exemplars into the “other” category, it was not required. 
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 In the faces version of the experiment, 8 of the 30 subjects learned the three 
categories to criterion.  During testing, subjects categorized an average of 47% of the 
learned category members in accordance with their generating prototypes.  Those 
subjects who learned the categories to criterion during training categorized 61% in 
accordance with their generating prototypes while those subjects who did not learn to 
criterion only categorized 43% in accordance with their generating prototypes.  If 
subjects were able to perfectly use the learned generating prototypes, they would have 
been able to get an average of 86% correct.  Overall, subjects categorized 12% of the 
unlearned exemplars according to their generating prototype, with subjects who learned 
the categories correctly categorizing 21% and subjects who did not learn the categories 
correctly categorizing 9%.  On average, subjects put 48 exemplars into the “other” 
category, with a standard deviation of 59.  Five subjects did not put any exemplars into 
the “other” category during the testing phase, two of whom learned the three trained 
categories to criterion. 
Modeling 
 Analysis of Experiment 3 was performed in a manner similar to Experiment 1.  
The main question was whether subjects were sensitive to both dimensions of the 
stimulus when creating their “other” category.  For the purpose of analysis, what subjects 
marked as one of the three learned categories were considered to be one category, and the 
stimuli subjects marked as “other” were considered to be the second category.  With only 
two groups, the models from Experiment 1 were also applied to these data.  Recall that, if 
subjects were sensitive to both dimensions, the ellipse model would fit best.  Analyses 
were performed on the data from all subjects who placed more than 10 exemplars into the 
“other” category, starting 100 trials into the testing phase. 
 In the alien cell version, 32 subjects placed more than 10 exemplars into the 
“other” category.  In fitting the models to subjects data, twelve subjects were best fit by a 
line across the color dimension, three were best fit by a line across the length dimension, 
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two were best fit by a band across the color dimension, two were best fit by a band across 
the length dimension, and thirteen were best fit by the random model.  See Figure 6, 
where the results are collapsed across linear models to show which dimensions subjects 
were attending to.  None of the subjects’ categorizations of the “other” category were 
best fit by the ellipse model, indicating that none of them accounted for both dimensions 
in their created category. 
 In the face version, 22 subjects placed more than 10 exemplars into the “other” 
category.  Four of these were best fit by a line across the eye distance dimension, two 
were best fit by a band along the eye distance dimension, three were best fit by the ellipse 
model, and thirteen were best fit by the random model (Figure 6). 
Discussion 
 Experiment 3 was conducted to test the hypothesis that if a person is 
knowledgeable of other categories that are comprised of the same, multiple dimensions 
that an unknown category is comprised of, they will be sensitive to those dimensions 
when constructing a new category.  This experiment did not provide evidence in support 
of this hypothesis.  Out of the 54 subjects, only three were best fit by the ellipse model, 
about 6% ± 7.  In fact, by far the best fitting model was the random model, which best fit 
48% ± 13 of the subjects.  This does not mean, however, that the subjects were making 
category decisions randomly.  First, the random model is dependent on the percentage of 
stimuli put into the “other” category.  With only 25% of the stimuli originating from this 
category, the design of this experiment biases in favor of the random model.  On average, 
subjects placed only 9% of the stimuli into the “other” category.  Since the random 
category is dependent on the percentage of category members “in the category,” this low 
category membership would make for an average random category fit of 84% correct.  
Second, even if it appears that subjects were placing exemplars into the “other” category 
randomly, they could still be sorting the three learned categories multidimensionally.  For 
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the purpose of analysis, however, these were all collapsed into one “learned” category.  It 
is possible that subjects who were best fit by the random model were using the “other” 
category as a catch-all for hard to categorize exemplars that straddled the borders 
between known categories, making this categorization appear random. 
 Similarly, collapsing the exemplars marked as coming from the three learned 
category into one category for the sake of modeling can obscure other types of 
categorization behavior.  A number of subjects in both versions of the experiment 
appeared to learn the original categories by learning to attend to one dimension, and then 
if this doesn’t sufficiently classify the exemplar, to attend to the second.  An example of 
this can be seen in the left and middle panels of Figure 7, which show feedback during 
training and subject’s response during training respectively.  Even though this subject has 
obviously learned the categories, looking to the right panel, which shows responses 
during testing, you can see that the subject learned that any exemplar with a dark nucleus 
is in one category, and if it has a light nucleus, then you have to look to the mitochondria 
length to differentiate.  When this subject saw cells with dark nuclei and short 
mitochondria (the group not shown during training), their rule classified these cells along 
with the cells with dark nuclei and long mitochondria. The black dots on Figure 7 
represent the exemplars that the subject put into the “other” category and show that they 
used this category for exemplars with extremely dark nuclei.  This rule based behavior 
seems similar to the behavior observed by Medin and colleagues who showed subjects 
objects whose dimensions had three levels and asked them to make two categories, and 
the subjects still created rules to divide the stimuli along one dimension (Medin et al., 
1987). 
 Category construction experiments have been a fruitful area for the proponents of 
the “knowledge theory” of categorization (Kaplan & Murphy, 1999; Medin et al., 1987; 
Spalding & Murphy, 1996).  They show that subjects are able (or willing) to create 
multidimensional categories when they align the to-be-categorized stimuli with 
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categories already in their knowledge structure.  The question remains, however, to what 
extent subjects are creating a new category rather than applying an old one in a novel 
way.  Experiment 3 indicates that either: a) there is a limit of how sparse the already 
existent categories can be for them to help subjects create a new multidimensional 
category, or b) prior experiments showing the effects of knowledge on category creation 
are in-fact just applying old multidimensional categories in new ways. 
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CHAPTER 6 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 Traditional categorization experiments have taken an all or none view towards 
giving subjects feedback.  Those that always give subjects feedback create an highly 
stylized learning environment, while those who give no feedback see categorization 
behavior in subjects that is highly unlike categorization behavior seen outside the lab.  
These experiments examined different methods to induce subjects to create more realistic 
categories with either a more realistic feedback setting (that is, the no feedback condition 
and the little feedback condition in Experiments 1 and 2 respectively) or a more realistic 
knowledge base (that is, the no knowledge condition and the little knowledge condition in 
Experiments 1 and 3 respectively).  Models were fit to their categorization decisions to 
determine which dimensions subjects attended to when categorizing.  Experiment 1 found 
a minimal impact of size and similarity of category members on subjects’ propensity to 
create the complex categories seen in categorization behavior outside of the lab.  
Experiment 3 found no evidence that a prior familiarity with the category dimensions 
increases multidimensional categorization of a new category.  Experiment 2, however, 
found provisional evidence that minimal feedback improves multidimensional 
categorization. Additionally, Experiment 3 provides support that the increase in complex 
categorization seen in Experiment 2 is due to the minimal feedback and not due to the 
change in stimuli, since Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 used the same stimuli, and there 
was minimal complex categorization in Experiment 3. 
 Prior experiments have found that subjects will create multidimensional 
categories when extensively trained, when the features of the to-be-created categories are 
informed by previously known categories, or when there is some task where subjects 
need to use the items in addition to purely categorizing them.  Of these three, it seems 
that the last is most informative about the way that category creation occurs outside of the 
lab.  Most people, aside from Lewis Carol, do not create categories randomly or for 
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amusement.  They create them when they can be beneficial to understanding objects they 
encounter or for predicting the behavior of new objects – exactly the reasons that 
categorization is important to study.  Complex category creation, however, counts as 
higher-level cognition, and probably requires a fair amount of cognitive effort and 
resources that people are, for the most part, unwilling to spend unless it is necessary or 
will obviously benefit them.  Just a little feedback, it seems, may also be enough to 
encourage them to spend that energy. 
 Many of the traditional categorization experiments have utilized highly stylized 
categories containing five or less exemplars and extensive trial-by-trial feedback.  
Although researchers would like to generalize from these studies to the categories that 
people use in their everyday life, the great difference between the extensive nature of 
everyday categories and the limited nature of categories learned in the lab, coupled with 
their overly attentive feedback structure, calls into question the external validity of these 
findings.  If subjects can be inspired to create complex categories on their own in the lab, 
these categories can then be used as a more valid base to test theories of categorization 
that have been proposed, such a the nature of their representation.  Having subjects use 
the category members in an effort to get them to construct complex categories, however, 
may defeat the purpose of using abstract categories in categorization research, since 
subjects have now assigned meaning to the categories (i.e., category members are now 
seen as “doing something”).  The findings of Experiment 2 indicate that a minimal 
feedback structure may be a way to inspire complex category creation in subjects that is 
better tailored to using that created category for future experiments. 
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Figure 1.  Examples of the circle and radial line stimulus space. 
Note.  Stimuli can take any intermittent value along either dimension. 
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Figure 2.  Example data and model fitting. 
Note.  1) Linear model – size; 2) Linear model – angle; 3) Band model – size; 4) Band model – angle; 5) Elliptical model. 
Green circles represent stimuli subjects placed into the category, while black plusses represent stimuli subjects placed out of the 
category. 
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Table 1.  Experiment 1 Results – Descriptives 
Condition # In Category Actual % Correct Possible % Correct 
LowSD-LowCat 354 51.2% 95.58% 
LowSD-MedCat 464 60.7% 96.92% 
LowSD-HiCat 148 80.8% 98.07% 
MedSD-LowCat 360 42.5% 84.57% 
MedSD-MedCat 339 62.6% 88.92% 
MedSD-HiCat 434 60.3% 93.89% 
HiSD - LowCat 485 52.2% 65.43% 
HiSD-MedCat 454 54.6% 77.70% 
HiSD-HiCat 171 72.9% 86.42% 
Total 358 59.2% 87.4% 
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Table 2.  Experiment 1 results - Percent of performance accounted for by model 
  Standard Deviation Conditions  
Category Membership 
Conditions Models Low SD Medium SD  High SD Total 
       
Size 0% 33% 0% 11% ± 16 
Angle 40% 67% 71% 61% ± 21 
Ellipse 0% 0% 14% 6% ± 14 Low Category 
Random 60% 0% 14% 22% ± 19 
      
Size 25% 13% 17% 17% ± 18 
Angle 50% 88% 83% 78% ± 19 
Ellipse 25% 0% 0% 6% ± 14 Medium Category 
Random 0% 0% 0% 0% 
      
Size 0% 17% 0% 6% ± 15 
Angle 67% 50% 80% 65% ± 21 
Ellipse 33% 33% 20% 29% ± 20 High Category 
Random 0% 0% 0% 0% 
      
Size 7% ± 16 20% ± 17 6% ± 17 11% ± 9 
Angle 53% ± 22 70% ± 19 78% ± 19 68% ± 12 
Ellipse 20% ± 20 10% ± 15 11% ± 15 13% ± 9 Total 
Random 20% ± 20 0% 6% ± 11 8% ± 8 
 
Note. 95% confidence intervals were only calculated for marginal means and totals due to sample size requirements.  Additionally, 
confidence intervals for cells with no occurrences cannot be calculated. 
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Figure 3.  Examples of the alien cell stimulus space. 
Note.  Stimuli can take any intermittent value along either dimension. 
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Figure 4.  Examples of the face stimulus space. 
Note.  Stimuli can take any intermittent value along either dimension. 
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Figure 5.  Experiment 2 results – Percent of performance accounted for by dimension. 
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Figure 6.  Experiment 3 results – Percent of performance accounted for by dimension. 
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Figure 7.  An example subject from Experiment 3 displaying category expansion. 
Note. The left graph is the feedback subject 3 received during training, the middle graph is their response, and the right graph is their 
categorization behavior during testing.  Note how the green category expands to fill up the empty space below it, indicating the subject 
learned strategy where if it was a dark nucleus, it was in one category, but if it was a light nucleus, they attended to the mitochondria 
length.  Also, this subject here used the “other” category to indicate exemplars that had extremely dark nuclei. 
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